Stratfor 05-Dec-13
Summary
With the U.S.-Iranian rapprochement and a sectarian conflict brewing to its north in Syria, Israel will likely work closely with Turkey and Saudi Arabia in an attempt to secure its interests. Given that Israel has not normalized relations with Saudi Arabia, that track will probably be pursued behind the scenes. However, Israel can work much more robustly with Turkey, despite the rupture in relations since the 2010 flotilla incident. For its part, Turkish regional interests have been set back by the rise of jihadism in Syria and the eclipse of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt -- events that have forced Ankara to adjust its attitude toward Israel.
Analysis
On Dec. 5, Israeli Environmental Affairs Minister Amir Peretz became the first Cabinet member to visit Turkey since bilateral relations took a plunge after the flotilla incident that left nine Turkish nationals dead. Peretz is in Istanbul to attend a U.N. conference on maritime issues attended by officials from 21 Mediterranean states. The visit comes nine months after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, under pressure from U.S. President Barack Obama, acceded to Turkey's demand, apologized for the deaths and agreed to compensate the families of those killed in the incident.
The apology kicked off a process of normalization. Since then, the two sides have been discussing the details of the compensation and restoring ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations. Peretz's visit, though it revolves around a multilateral event, suggests that the behind-the-scenes talks have seen considerable progress.
Even though relations will take a while to return to where they were before the flotilla incident, there is significant incentive for both countries to want a resolution. For Israel, the efforts toward a U.S.-Iranian detente have substantially added to its security concerns since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The United States and Iran seeking to end 35 years of hostility has a direct impact on Tehran's ability to project power along Israel's northern frontier, especially in Syria, where the Israelis have already been trying to find ways to balance between Shiite and Sunni radicals.
Countering Iran in the wake of the U.S.-Iranian diplomatic engagement has brought Israeli interests closer in line with those of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the two countries can be expected to cooperate more closely than in the past, but the benefits for Israel are limited, especially since Saudi Arabia is backing many anti-Israeli Salafist and jihadist entities against the al Assad regime.
Image: Turkey and Israel
Israel has much more to gain from normalizing ties with Turkey, which shares a long border with Syria and thus shares Israel's fears of jihadists in Syria. Ankara has backed off from its hard-line stance against Damascus since it has become clear that various Islamist militias now clearly dominate the Syrian rebel landscape. Even though Turkey has welcomed the U.S.-Iranian diplomatic process, Ankara is not happy that a Tehran on its way to geopolitical rehabilitation will remain in Turkey's path toward increasing its influence in the Middle East. Thus, working with the Israelis could provide the Turks with leverage relative to the Iranians.
At the same time, the underlying factor that was driving Turkey toward a hard-line attitude toward Israel appears to be dissipating. Ankara had hoped that the Arab Spring would empower Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamists in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian territories, who could serve as mediums of influence for the Turkish government. The July 3 coup that toppled the government of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi and the subsequent decline of Hamas has done away with that opportunity, forcing Ankara to reassess its stance on Israel.
This does not mean Turkey and Israel will revert back to the old status quo. Where there are common interests, there are also clear differences in objectives. However, for the moment, the shared concerns are drawing both sides to one another.
Summary
With the U.S.-Iranian rapprochement and a sectarian conflict brewing to its north in Syria, Israel will likely work closely with Turkey and Saudi Arabia in an attempt to secure its interests. Given that Israel has not normalized relations with Saudi Arabia, that track will probably be pursued behind the scenes. However, Israel can work much more robustly with Turkey, despite the rupture in relations since the 2010 flotilla incident. For its part, Turkish regional interests have been set back by the rise of jihadism in Syria and the eclipse of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt -- events that have forced Ankara to adjust its attitude toward Israel.
Analysis
On Dec. 5, Israeli Environmental Affairs Minister Amir Peretz became the first Cabinet member to visit Turkey since bilateral relations took a plunge after the flotilla incident that left nine Turkish nationals dead. Peretz is in Istanbul to attend a U.N. conference on maritime issues attended by officials from 21 Mediterranean states. The visit comes nine months after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, under pressure from U.S. President Barack Obama, acceded to Turkey's demand, apologized for the deaths and agreed to compensate the families of those killed in the incident.
The apology kicked off a process of normalization. Since then, the two sides have been discussing the details of the compensation and restoring ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations. Peretz's visit, though it revolves around a multilateral event, suggests that the behind-the-scenes talks have seen considerable progress.
Even though relations will take a while to return to where they were before the flotilla incident, there is significant incentive for both countries to want a resolution. For Israel, the efforts toward a U.S.-Iranian detente have substantially added to its security concerns since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. The United States and Iran seeking to end 35 years of hostility has a direct impact on Tehran's ability to project power along Israel's northern frontier, especially in Syria, where the Israelis have already been trying to find ways to balance between Shiite and Sunni radicals.
Countering Iran in the wake of the U.S.-Iranian diplomatic engagement has brought Israeli interests closer in line with those of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the two countries can be expected to cooperate more closely than in the past, but the benefits for Israel are limited, especially since Saudi Arabia is backing many anti-Israeli Salafist and jihadist entities against the al Assad regime.
Image: Turkey and Israel
Israel has much more to gain from normalizing ties with Turkey, which shares a long border with Syria and thus shares Israel's fears of jihadists in Syria. Ankara has backed off from its hard-line stance against Damascus since it has become clear that various Islamist militias now clearly dominate the Syrian rebel landscape. Even though Turkey has welcomed the U.S.-Iranian diplomatic process, Ankara is not happy that a Tehran on its way to geopolitical rehabilitation will remain in Turkey's path toward increasing its influence in the Middle East. Thus, working with the Israelis could provide the Turks with leverage relative to the Iranians.
At the same time, the underlying factor that was driving Turkey toward a hard-line attitude toward Israel appears to be dissipating. Ankara had hoped that the Arab Spring would empower Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamists in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian territories, who could serve as mediums of influence for the Turkish government. The July 3 coup that toppled the government of Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi and the subsequent decline of Hamas has done away with that opportunity, forcing Ankara to reassess its stance on Israel.
This does not mean Turkey and Israel will revert back to the old status quo. Where there are common interests, there are also clear differences in objectives. However, for the moment, the shared concerns are drawing both sides to one another.
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